Warship Incident: British Cruisers Screwed Up, Russians Not So Much

Retired U.S. Navy Destroyer Skipper Evaluates the Warning-Shot Scenario

Tate Westbrook Jun 17   ∙   Guest post

READ IN APP

The author is a retired U.S. naval officer whose service included command of the destroyer USS Spruance. Westbrook now teaches navigation to cruisers at Trawler Academy in the Chesapeake Bay region. (For context: The June 16 incident came after British forces had boarded Smyrtos, a sanctioned Russian shadow fleet tanker, in the English Channel on Sunday.)

First, let’s discuss the challenge of any warship maneuvering in the vicinity of civilian vessels. I have encountered thousands of situations of egregious violations of the rules of the road by hapless amateur yahoos that regularly their vessels at risk. However, though warning shots are a legal option, they are so far down the list of available options to a ship’s crew that I would never consider using them.

And I would add to that thousands of examples of me and my crew trying in vain to raise recreational vessels on channel 13 VHF, and then on Channel 16.

Sadly, too many immature mariners either don’t keep their radio tuned to the required channels 13 and 16, or do not know enough about squelch to properly set up their radio to receive a signal.

Given the recent tensions between Russia and the United Kingdom, any prudent mariner would avoid steaming near any warship in that vicinity. Russian naval vessels are very distinct in their extremely dark shade of gray paint, so easily recognizable. It is also very likely that there would have been at least one Royal Navy or ship in the vicinity, as I found several articles that referenced the range of separation between the sailboat and the Russian destroyer with precision.

I also found at least one reference that stated that the Russian ship was doing drift operations. That is common to save fuel. However, on that mental checklist of options available to any ship’s captain in this situation, starting the main engines and maneuvering away from the sailboat would occur much higher on the list than firing warning shots.

Share

I choose to reference the BBC reporting to give us the perspective of the sailing couple, and that includes a few examples of poor seamanship that likely contributed to this situation.

The BBC quotes the sailboaters as stating that they changed course by “two degrees” would legally expected that tiny course change to ease the concerns of the Admiral Grigorovich crew. The stated Russian position is that the risk of collision existed, so the two-degree course change was a violation of rule eight which requires maneuvers to be done early and a significant enough course or speed change to be obvious to the other vessel. Two degrees does not meet that requirement.

That said, the obligation to maneuver to avoid collision remained with the Russian destroyer. They were operating well offshore, not in restricted waters or in a channel, and the warship clearly a power driven vessel that is obligated to keep clear of the sailboat

Actually, I retract my previous assessment about the drifting operations, because the only place that I can find that mentioned is attributed to UK ministry of defense assessment of the situation.

The allegation of drifting operations is really irrelevant. Whether they have their main engines online or not, they were underway in accordance with the COLREG rules of the road.

I have operated often in the vicinity of Russian warships. Though certainly not as capable a Navy as the United States Navy or our NATO allies, they are still professional Mariners and have always behaved rationally in every encounter I have had with them, and all of their officers speak excellent English and communicate effectively on the radio.

Given the current situation of ongoing tensions between Russia and the United Kingdom, I expect their overall tone on board the Admiral Grigorovich was to avoid any encounters with merchant ships or recreational vessels. They exercised all legal options are available to them to get the attention of a vessel that by all reports, including the interview by the BBC, was too close to a warship (or any ship) at sea: 500 yards or less.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense statement was that the use of warning shots was reckless. Maybe so, and I would not have chosen this if I were standing on the bridge of my destroyer back in the day. But equally reckless is a couple under sail not monitoring the VHF radio as is required by law, and upon hearing the five-short blasts on the ship’s whistle not immediately initiating communications with the ship.

Jane Kelvey stated that her sailboat “definitely was not on a collision course.” The fact that she admits being within 500 yards, never answered the radio, and incorrectly believed that a two-degree course change is sufficient if risk of collision exists makes me question her ability to determine whether risk of collision exists.

Finally, it is prudent to review with your readers, the concept of “naval vessel protection zone” in the United States around warships. Authorities, prohibitions, and actions available are clearly defined in a radius of 100 yards and 500 yards around these vessels at all times.

Nearly all other nations with navies and Coast Guards have similar rules and regulations

I am confident the Russians were on the radio trying to hail them, and do not accept Jane Kelvey’s claim to the contrary.

I also accept Russian statements that they fired flares to draw attention of the sailboat. I have fired flares in similar situations from my ships over the years, but in daytime they are difficult to see, and therefore not particularly effective.

And, as a modification of my previous statement about warning, shots being very low on my personal list, that applies in open ocean waters like this situation. So edit my previous input accordingly.

I will add the caveat that on two occasions when I was the executive officer USS Laboon (DDG 58) based in Norfolk, Virginia. We used the 12-gauge noise making rounds to get the attention of recreational Boats maneuvering near us in the Elizabeth River who were violating the naval vessel protection zone.

After those two incidents, I established a policy of always having at least one of the ships RHIB Boats in the water at all times when we were maneuvering in the Norfolk Harbor area. That allowed the boat to intercept and escort in a recreational voters who were approaching the NVPZ.

Deploying the small boat from a warship in an open ocean transit is rarely an option due to sea state.

I just reread the BBC article and noticed its description of “foggy conditions.”

Now, I am even more frustrated with the sailboat—sailing in conditions of restricted visibility means their watchstanding vigilance should have been heightened, which brings me right back to the requirement to maintain a watch on VHF Channel 16 for international hailing.

This also makes me more doubtful of the U.K. MoD assessment that the Admiral Gregorovitch was drifting—very unlikely in conditions of restricted visibility. Even if the Russians were trying to conserve fuel, Rule 19 requires vessels operating in for near conditions of restricted visibility to keep their engines ready for immediate maneuver.

The interview also references the word “rifles,” so that suggests that the destroyer did not fire its main battery gun, but instead a couple of sailors on deck, firing blank rifle rounds, or a similar noisemaking shotgun round like the U.S. Navy has available. Bottom line: Nothing reckless about this incident.

The cautionary lesson for your readers is to ensure an understanding of the NVPZ in effect in U.S. Waters and an equivalent in effect and nearly every other countries territorial sea and international waters when you encounter a warship. Expect even greater aggressive defense of these vessels if they are nuclear powered.

The NVPZ is for the safety of the warship and for the public safety, since from my perspective of standing watch on a destroyer or cruiser, any vessel that penetrates the NVPZ, doesn’t respond to my radio hails, and ignores the whistles, flares and the warning shots is also beginning to march quickly down a different checklist we use: The one used for determining hostile intent.

At the end of that checklist is the use of deadly force for ship self defense, which ANY warship retains regardless of location.